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ARKANSAS
John Peiserich†
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the government have the authority to alter the terms of an
agreement between private parties that it deems unfair? At first pass,
most Americans would agree that it does not. Of course, exceptions
apply. American courts exercise the right to break up monopolies,1
enforce a minimum wage,2 and invalidate contracts that they deem
unconscionable.3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I3.3
†

John Peiserich has been practicing in Arkansas since 2002 with a focus on oil, gas,
and environmental issues. He routinely represents clients before the Arkansas
Department of Energy and Environment, both the Division of Oil & Gas and the
Division of Environmental Quality, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and
other governmental agencies, and litigates complex oil, gas, and environmental
issues.
1. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (2018).
3. See GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Lamb, 487 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Ark. 2016)
(citing LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Ark. 2013)),
discussing procedural unconscionability, in which there is an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with terms that are unreasonable
favorable to the other party, and substantive unconscionability, which generally
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The Arkansas Supreme Court recently extended these exceptions to
include agreements that involve the complex realm of oil and gas law.
The forced integration of interest owners in a drilling unit compels
administrative agencies to consider who among the unit owners,
lessees, and operators owes what to whom. Additionally, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity governs whether an aggrieved party may even
challenge such a determination by a government agency. Through a
two-part decision, the Supreme Court of Arkansas clarified that the
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (the “Commission”) has the
authority to evaluate the fairness of compensation owed by a unit
operator to a party who does not consent to integration. Within this
industry-specific holding, which this Article will show was a natural
development of state oil and gas law, the Arkansas Supreme Court
notably also reinforced that sovereign immunity does not bar a party’s
right to judicial review of administrative decisions, but it signaled a
significant pivot away from traditional agency deference.
Part II of this Article discusses the statutory and regulatory
framework of Arkansas oil and gas law as it relates to the Court’s
decision. Part III tracks the journey of the case through the Arkansas
courts. Part IV analyzes the courts’ decisions on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, judicial deference to agency decisions, and the
Commission’s general authority, concluding that the Court properly
applied Arkansas law and did not expand the Commission’s authority.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission
In 1939, the Arkansas Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act
created the Commission and gave it the authority to regulate the
production of oil and gas.4 Pursuant to this authority, the Commission
adopted spacing regulations that limit the number of wells that can be
drilled in a drilling unit.5 Because a drilling unit is often comprised of
many property owners, the Commission further has authority to, and
in fact must, order all tracts and interests to integrate on the application
involves excessive price or restriction of remedies.
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-71-101 (2019) (legislative creation); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 15-71-110 (2019) (legislative charge); 1938 Ark. Acts 105, 219 (codified as
amended at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 15-72-101-407); Thomas A. Daily, Rules Done
Right: How Arkansas Brought its Oil and Gas Law into a Horizontal World, 68 ARK.
L. REV. 259, 265 (2015).
5. 178-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § B-3 (2020).
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of any mineral owner or operator if all parties do not voluntarily pool
their interests.6 Pooling is the integration of separately-owned tracts of
land in a drilling unit, where drilling and production costs are shared
among lessees (also known as the working-interest owners), and
revenue is shared by all owners of mineral rights in the unit.7 These
owners may agree on a plan of development for the unit and
voluntarily pool their interests, or the Commission may order forced
pooling through the integration process.8
If the Commission orders integration, an unleased mineral owner
generally has three choices, which will be specified in an integration
order: (1) participate in the well by paying a proportionate share of
production costs (and assuming a share of the initial financial risk) and
taking a share of production revenues;9 (2) lease his or her interest to
the unit operators and receive a negotiated royalty, not less than oneeighth, plus a bonus that the Commission determines;10 or (3) “go nonconsent” and allow the participating owners to cover the nonconsenting owner’s share of upfront production costs.11 An owner who
elects the third option will only receive his or her proportionate share
of production revenue (less an additional “risk factor” penalty set by
the Commission) after the participating interest owners recoup the
initial production costs.12
B. Judicial Review
The Commission’s integration order is a final agency action, which
sets forth the integration options for affected mineral interest owners.13
Therefore, the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”)
governs all appeals of integration orders.14 Under the APA, any
interested party who has exhausted their administrative remedies

6. Phillip E. Norvell, Prelude to the Future of Shale Gas Development: Well
Spacing and Integration for the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, 49 WASHBURN L.J.
457, 463 (2010) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-303(b) (2019); see also Patrick H.
Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Responses to a
New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 326 (2014).
7. Patrick H. Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative
Responses to a New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 327 (2014).
8. Norvell, supra note 6, at 463 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-303(a)).
9. Id. at 464 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(3)).
10. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4), (d)).
11. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4)).
12. Id.
13. 178-00-001-A-(2)(l) ARK. CODE R. § B-3 (2020).
14. Id.
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through the Commission may appeal the integration order in circuit
court with the Commission as the defendant.15
C. Agency Deference
Reviewing courts must determine the deference that should be
given to agency decisions, such as Commission integration orders.
The challenging party has the burden of proving an absence of
substantial evidence to support an agency’s factual findings.16 The
Arkansas Supreme Court has not applied a consistent standard of
deference regarding agencies’ interpretations of statutes.17 In some
cases, the Court conducted a de novo review, explaining that it is the
court’s power to interpret statutes.18 In other cases, the Arkansas
Supreme Court adopted a de novo but deferential “clearly wrong”
review for an agency’s statutory interpretation19 or has omitted the de
novo standard and announced only the deferential “clearly wrong”
review.20
D. Arkansas Sovereign Immunity
Because any judicial challenge to a Commission integration order
requires a suit against the state of Arkansas, sovereign immunity must
also be considered. Sovereign immunity is currently a hot topic in
Arkansas that has been revisited in multiple recent Arkansas Supreme
Court decisions.
Article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution provides that
“[t]he [s]tate of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her
courts.”21 Prior to 2018, the Arkansas Supreme Court routinely held
that sovereign immunity may be overcome when an agency is acting
illegally, or, since 1996, when the legislature specifically waives
sovereign immunity, which it has done in numerous state statutes.22
15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-106(a) (2019).
16. Ark. Racing Comm’n v. Wayne Ward, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Ark. 2001).
17. Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 616–17 (Ark. 2020) (“We
acknowledge confusion in prior cases regarding the standard of review for agency
interpretations of a statute . . . .”).
18. Miller v. Enders, 425 S.W.3d 723, 726 (Ark. 2013); Ark. Game & Fish
Comm’n v. Gerard, 541 S.W.3d 422, 425–26 (Ark. 2018).
19. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Pierce, 435 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Ark. 2014);
McLane S., Inc. v. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd., 375 S.W.3d 628, 640 (Ark. 2010).
20. See, e.g., Brookshire v. Adcock, 307 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Ark. 2009).
21. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20.
22. Ark. Dep’t of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff, 425 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2013);
Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v. Staton, 942 S.W.2d 804 (Ark. 1996) (citing ARK.
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This changed with the issuance of Board of Trustees of University of
Arkansas v. Andrews, in which the Arkansas Supreme Court departed
from earlier precedent and held that the Arkansas General Assembly
cannot waive the state’s sovereign immunity.23 In that case, a
terminated employee of a state community college brought an action
against the college under the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act
(“AMWA”) for failing to compensate him for overtime.24 The Court
acknowledged previous holdings that the legislature could waive
sovereign immunity but ultimately concluded that AMWA’s provision
allowing suits against the state for unpaid overtime wages was
incompatible with article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution.25
In reaching its decision, the Andrews Court explained, “[a] suit
against the [s]tate is barred by the sovereign immunity doctrine if a
judgment for the plaintiff will operate to control the action of the
[s]tate or subject it to liability.” Based on this description of sovereign
immunity, the Court held that “suits subjecting the state to financial
liability are barred by sovereign immunity and that plaintiffs like
Andrews with these causes of actions have a proper avenue for redress
against [s]tate action, which is to file a claim with the Arkansas Claims
Commission.”26 The only exception to this broadened view of
sovereign immunity explicitly recognized in Andrews applies when
the government is operating “illegally.”27
Though the Court cautioned in a footnote in a subsequent case
upholding Andrews that it “should not be interpreted too broadly,”28
the implications of the Andrews decision are extensive. Under a literal
reading of the Andrews opinion, Arkansas state courts would no longer
have jurisdiction to conduct appellate review of any final agency
action (including Commission integration orders) despite the many
statutes guaranteeing an appeal.29

CODE ANN. § 26-18-507(e)(2)(A)); See discussion infra Section III.B.1, IV.A.
23. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Ark. 2018).
24. Id. at 617 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4-201 to -222).
25. Id. at 622.
26. Id. at 619.
27. Id.
28. Ark. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs v. Mallett, 549 S.W.3d 351, 352 n.2 (Ark.
2018).
29. Compare Andrews, 535 S.W.3d at 619, with ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212
(right to judicial review under the APA).
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III. HURD ET. AL. V. ARKANSAS OIL AND GAS COMMISSION
A. Factual Background
All of the legal issues described above came together in two
Arkansas Supreme Court opinions arising from a dispute between
members of the Hurd and Killam families (collectively, “the Hurds”)
and a natural gas production company, SWN Production Arkansas,
LLC, formerly known as SEECO, Inc. (“SWN”). SWN was the
operator of numerous oil and gas wells in the Fayetteville Shale area.
In 2010, the Hurds leased mineral interests in Cleburne County,
Arkansas, which the Commission then integrated into two units
naming SWN as the designated operator.30 Importantly, these
contained a “stratigraphic Pugh clause.”31
Oil and gas leases executed in the Fayetteville Shale generally
include all oil and gas owned by the lessor beneath the leased
premises. Accordingly, no further leasing or integration of most
mineral owners is required to drill into a different formation within a
producing unit. However, some sophisticated owners (like the Hurds)
insert a stratigraphic Pugh clause into their leases that causes their oil
and gas lease to terminate to depths below the deepest producing
interval after a specified time. This type of clause can be attractive to
lessors who want a “second bite at the apple” and want to gamble on
getting a higher royalty later if there is additional development in their
unit. Along with this potential benefit, a lessor with a stratigraphic
Pugh clause also risks a possible decline in the market.32
Because there had been no natural gas production below the
Fayetteville Shale formation during the primary term, the Hurds
became unleased as to any depths below the Fayetteville Shale
formation.33 Accordingly, when SWN sought to drill natural gas wells
to the lower Moorefield Shale formation in 2017, the Hurds’ interests
in this formation had to be re-leased or otherwise integrated.34 Based
on market conditions at the time, SWN began offering unleased
mineral owners, including the Hurds, a new lease that included either
a one-seventh royalty or a $100 per acre bonus and a one-eighth
royalty.35
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Ark. 2020).
Id.
Appellant’s Br. at Addendum 325, Hurd, 601 S.W.3d 100 (No. 19-808).
Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 101.
Id. at 101–02.
Id. at 102.
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In February 2017, SWN requested that the Commission integrate
two units for the purpose of drilling in the Moorefield Shale
formation.36 On March 6, 2017, the Commission granted SWN’s
application and issued two integration orders that included provisions
allowing a period of time for unleased mineral interest owners to either
participate in the costs of completing and operating the well or to “go
non-consent.”37 As to interest owners who elected to go non-consent,
both integration orders provided:
6.B. Uncommitted Leasehold Working Interest
Owner(s)
Leasehold royalty shall be paid according to the
provisions of the valid lease(s) existing for each
separately owned tract, except where the Commission
finds that such lease(s) provide for an excessive,
unreasonably high rate of royalty, as compared with the
royalty determined by the Commission to be
reasonable and consistent with the royalty negotiated
for lease(s) made at arm’s length in the general area
where the Unit is located . . . .38
Upon hearing of the integration applications, SWN subsequently
learned that the Hurds had executed self-dealing leases between their
own family-owned oil and gas companies with a 25% royalty.39 On
March 8, 2017, SWN filed supplemental applications with the
Commission, stating that it expected the Hurds to go non-consent,
thereby exempting them from shouldering any production costs or
financial risk.40 SWN alleged that the 25% royalty attempted in the
Hurds’ leases was unreasonable and asked the Commission to set a
reasonable royalty rate.41
At an evidentiary hearing held in June 2017, SWN presented
evidence that gas prices had declined since 2010, SWN was the only
company taking Moorefield-only leases, and the highest bonus and
royalty paid for Moorefield-only interests in the relevant sections was

36. Id. at 101–02.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Appellant’s Br. at Addendum 177, Hurd, 601 S.W.3d 100 (Ark. 2020) (No.
19-808).
39. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 102.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 102–03.
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what SWN offered to the Hurds and other unleased mineral owners.42
The Hurds argued, conversely, that a 20–25% royalty was reasonable
based on estimated production from the recoverable reserve.43 The
Commission held that any royalty rate over one-seventh was excessive
and unreasonably high based on the circumstances and entered
supplemental integration orders capping SWN’s royalty obligations to
the Hurds at one-seventh.44
1. The Circuit Court Dismissal
The Hurds petitioned for judicial review of the Commission’s
supplemental integration, arguing that the supplemental integration
orders were outside the Commission’s statutory authority and were
arbitrary and capricious.45 Less than one week before the court was set
to hear the matter, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued its opinion in
the landmark Andrews case, holding that the state legislature does not
have the power to waive sovereign immunity and prompting the
Commission to file a motion to dismiss in Hurd.46 The court dismissed
the Hurds’ petition, finding that sovereign immunity barred the Hurds
from seeking judicial review. But the circuit court also took it a step
further, finding the adjudicatory provisions of the APA
unconstitutional in light of Andrews and that because there was no
right of review of the Commission’s orders, any such orders were void
from the start.47 The Commission and SWN appealed, and the Hurds
filed a cross-appeal.48
B. The First Arkansas Supreme Court Decision (2018)
The first appeal focused solely on the threshold sovereign immunity
issue. Interestingly, all parties challenged the circuit court’s order of
dismissal. The Commission argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
42. Id. at 103.
43. Id.
44. Appellant’s Abstract, Br., and Addendum at Ab. 98–99, Hurd, 601 S.W.3d
100 (Ark. 2020) (No. CV-19-808).
45. Pet. for Review ¶ 18, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052
(Ark. Cir. Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961) (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15212(h)).
46. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Ark. 2018);
See Resp’ts Mot. to Dismiss, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052
(Ark. Cir. Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961).
47. Order ¶ 8, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052 (Ark. Cir.
Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961).
48. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 249 (Ark. 2018).
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to invalidate the APA and the Commission’s orders after it found that
the petition was barred by sovereign immunity.49 SWN contended that
original actions seeking monetary damages from the state are
distinguishable from petitions for review of an administrative decision
and that applying sovereign immunity to bar judicial review of agency
actions would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by delegating
final adjudication of rights to the executive branch.50 The Hurds
argued that judicial review of an agency action is constitutional
because sovereign immunity is waivable and that judicial review was
proper because the Commission exceeded its authority by reducing the
royalty rates in their leases.51
The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with SWN’s first argument,
reiterating its Andrews holding that sovereign immunity applies when
a judgment for the plaintiff would control the action of the state or
subject the state to liability.52 The Court agreed with SWN that the role
of the Commission, though named as defendant in the matter, was like
a trial court in an appellate proceeding: it had no vested interest in the
outcome of the appeal.53 The Court found sovereign immunity was
therefore inapplicable even under Andrews and also reversed the
circuit court’s ruling, declaring the adjudicatory provisions of the APA
unconstitutional and the Commission’s orders void from the start.54
The Court remanded the Hurds’ cross-appeal.55 On remand, the circuit
court affirmed the Commission’s decision, and the Hurds appealed.56
C. The Second Arkansas Supreme Court Decision (2020)
1. Agency Deference and Separation of Powers
The lawsuit was appealed a second time in 2020—this time on the
merits. The Arkansas Supreme Court ultimately upheld the integration
orders entered by the Commission. In doing so, the Court reinforced
49. Id. at 253.
50. Appellant SWN Prod. (Ark.), LLC’s Brief at Arg. 6-9, Ark. Oil & Gas
Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2018) (No. 18-233) (citing Singleton v.
City of Pine Bluff, 285 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Ark. App. 2008)).
51. Appellees/Cross Appellant’s Supplemental Abstract, Brief, and
Supplemental Addendum at Arg. 3-23, Ark. Oil. & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564
S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2018) (No. 18-233).
52. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d at 253.
53. Id. at 255 (citing Duit Constr. Co. v. Ark. State Claims Comm’n, 476 S.W.3d
791, 795 (Ark. 2015).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100 at 101 (Ark. 2020).
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its indication of a pivot on agency deference first announced earlier
this year in Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., Ltd., which held that courts
must review agency interpretations of statutes de novo because it is
solely within the judiciary’s power to interpret statutes. In the 2020
Hurd decision, the Court reiterated that while it gives unambiguous
statutes their plain meaning, “where ambiguity exists, the agency’s
interpretation will be one of [the court’s] many tools used to provide
guidance.”57
As to the scope of the Commission’s authority to set a reasonable
royalty rate, the Court’s decision focused on both Arkansas Code
Annotated section 15-71-110(a)(1), which authorizes the Commission
to enforce its statutory powers58 and Arkansas Code Annotated section
15-72-304(a), which provides:
[a]ll orders requiring integration shall be . . . upon
terms and conditions that are just and reasonable and
that will afford the owner of each tract or interest in the
drilling unit the opportunity to recover or receive his or
her just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the
pool without unnecessary expense . . . .59
The Court found that this clear and unambiguous language gave the
Commission explicit authority to ensure that all integration orders are
entered upon “just and reasonable” terms.60 While there is no statute
specifically stating that the Commission may reduce the royalty rate
in a lease to a reasonable market rate, the Court reasoned that there is
also no statute requiring consenting parties, such as SWN, to pay
royalties to an uncommitted leasehold working-interest owner who
elects to go non-consent.61 The Court agreed with SWN’s argument
that it would be impracticable for statutes to cover every possible
situation that an agency may encounter in carrying out its statutory
duties and that state agencies, including the Commission, have both
powers that are explicitly conferred by statute and that are necessarily
implied from a statute.62 Because the Commission’s reduction of the
57. Id. at 104 (citing Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Ark.
2020)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 104–05.
60. Id. at 105.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Walker v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 365 S.W.3d 899, 911 (Ark.
2010)).
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royalty to a reasonable rate was authorized by statute, the Court held
that the supplemental integration orders were neither ultra vires nor
arbitrary and capricious and affirmed the Commission’s supplemental
integration orders.63
IV. ANALYSIS
A. What the Hurd Decisions Mean for Sovereign Immunity
1. Analysis of Arkansas Supreme Court’s Reasoning (2018)
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s 2018 Hurd decision turned on
whether sovereign immunity barred judicial review of the
Commission’s actions.64 While Andrews was premised on damages
being sought from the state, the Court failed to distinguish between a
claim for damages and appellate review of final agency action.65 As
SWN argued, the destruction of traditional judicial review of agency
actions would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine and
improperly delegate absolute authority to the executive branch; an
agency’s actions are through the executive branch, so the agency has
no power to usurp the function of the judiciary and enter a final
adjudication of property or contractual rights.66
Barring judicial review would trigger other legal complications as
well. Many federal regulatory statutes allow states to administer the
provisions of various acts but require that the delegated state
authorities have adequate implementation and enforcement powers.67
For example, Clean Water Act regulations require state programs to

63. Id. at 106.
64. See Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 254 (Ark. 2020).
65. The Court did emphasize the availability of the Arkansas Claims
Commission, see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623
(Ark. 2018), which does not provide appellate review of agency action.
66. Appellant SWN’s Brief at Arg. 9, Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 1564
S.W.3d 248 (citing Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 285 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2008)).
67. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), (c)(3) (the Clean Water Act requires states
to possess “adequate authority” to carry out and “abate violations” of the program,
including through penalties); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(c)(1), 7412(l)(5–6) (the Clean Air
Act requires that state procedure must be adequate to implement and enforce New
Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
requires states to provide adequate enforcement of compliance with program
requirements).
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guarantee judicial review for agency decisions to retain their delegated
authority.68
The first circuit court decision in Hurd held that the Andrews
decision did in fact bar judicial review of agency actions.69 The court
reasoned that the adjudicatory provisions of the APA left citizens
without a mechanism to challenge agency actions, thereby violating
the guarantees of due process found in the Arkansas Constitution and
the United States Constitution.70
The Arkansas Supreme Court took this opportunity to narrow the
Andrews holding: judicial review of an agency decision is not barred
by sovereign immunity because the agency is not a real party-ininterest. The subject of the adjudication—the amount of royalty SWN
owed to the Hurds—did not affect the state’s funds or control its
actions.71
The Court backtracked from Andrews’s extreme result of a circuit
court striking the substantial statutory and regulatory framework as
well as thousands of judicial opinions that allow for judicial review of
agency decisions.72 However, the justices could not agree that the
Hurd decision cleared up Arkansas’s sovereign immunity law.73
Justice Baker dissented and urged that the Andrews court held that
“never means never” as stated in the Arkansas Constitution’s
sovereign immunity provision.74 The fact that Hurd involved a review
of an agency decision did not make it distinguishable from Andrews
because the Court did not identify any exceptions to sovereign
immunity in Andrews.75 Justice Baker further insisted, as she did in
her dissent in Andrews, that the Arkansas Constitution does not limit
sovereign immunity to money judgments. Therefore, the majority’s
holding that sovereign immunity did not apply because the suit did not
affect the state’s funds or action was inaccurate.76 Justice Baker
68. 40 C.F.R. § 123.30 (2012).
69. Order ¶ 7, Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 2018 WL 7133052 (Ark. Cir.
Feb. 12, 2018) (No. 60CV-17-3961).
70. Id. ¶ 4–8; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 13 (promises citizens the right to a remedy
for all wrongs suffered in person, property, or character); See BE&K Const. Co. v.
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 536 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution protects citizens’ rights to petition the government and access
the courts).
71. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, 564 S.W.3d 248, 255 (Ark. 2018)..
72. Id.
73. Id. at 258 (Baker, J.. dissenting); Id. at 256 (Hart, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 258 (Baker, J., dissenting). .
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ark. v. Andrews, 535 S.W.3d 616, 623
(Ark. 2018) (Baker, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the Commission’s decision constituted state conduct,
so the Andrews holding barred suit.77
Justice Hart concurred, citing Justice Baker’s concerns regarding
the scope of Andrews.78 She posited that continuing to awkwardly
develop sovereign immunity jurisprudence in light of Andrews is
unsustainable; the court should instead “wipe the slate” on sovereign
immunity.79 She pointed to the lack of constitutional analysis in
Andrews and the majority’s failure to define the opinion’s limitations,
which led to extensive litigation by public and private parties trying to
either weaponize or escape from Andrews.80
2. Subsequent Application of Andrews
The Court had occasion to apply Andrews again in 2019. In
Monsanto Company v. Arkansas State Plant Board, Monsanto
objected to the Plant Board’s promulgation of certain rules that would
prohibit the use of a particular pesticide. Monsanto framed each of its
claims to seek injunctive or declaratory relief for alleged illegal or
unconstitutional activity by the Plant Board or its members.81 The
parties agreed that sovereign immunity should not bar actions to enjoin
ultra vires government conduct, even after Andrews, but disagreed as
to whether the Plant Board’s conduct was ultra vires.82 The circuit
court dismissed all claims, explaining that Andrews precluded judicial
review of all agency actions, even ultra vires actions.83
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the Monsanto decision,
finding that the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity was intact
and applicable to the case.84 Specifically, where a claim is based on
alleged ultra vires conduct on the part of the state and the claimant
seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, sovereign immunity is
inapplicable.85

77. Id. at 259 (Baker, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 256 (Hart, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Monsanto Co. v. Ark. State Plant Bd., 576 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ark. 2019).
82. Id. at 11.
83. Id. at 11–12.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. (citing Martin v. Haas, 556 S.W.3d 509, 509 (Ark. 2018) in which a voter
brought an action against the Arkansas Secretary of State, seeking to declare a
legislative act unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement).
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Justice Baker again dissented and opined that Andrews in fact did
not provide for an ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity.86 She
further stated that “until Andrews is overruled, suit against the [s]tate
is barred, and the majority cannot pick and choose when an exception
or exemption may apply.”87
Because the Arkansas Supreme Court decision in Andrews sparked
confusion in Arkansas courts, the Court’s decision in Hurd signals
movement toward a clearer and more practical understanding of
sovereign immunity. Whether the Court will explicitly overturn
Andrews remains to be seen.
B. Hurd, the Myers Standard, and the Future of Agency Deference in
Arkansas
In Hurd, the appellants challenged the lower court’s ruling by
contending that agency deference impermissibly conflicted with the
separation-of-powers doctrine.88 The Court used Hurd to emphasize
its recently announced adoption of the Myers standard of review for
agency deference and held that there was “no need to further discuss
[the] appellants’ argument in this regard.”89 The Court reiterated this
new view of agency deference in Hurd, holding:
[W]e clarify today that agency interpretations of
statutes will be reviewed de novo. After all, it is the
province and duty of this Court to determine what a
statute means. In considering the meaning and effect of
a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the
words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in
common language. An unambiguous statute will be
interpreted based solely on the clear meaning of the
text. But where ambiguity exists, the agency’s
interpretation will be one of our many tools used to
provide guidance.90
In Myers, Mary Myers, the wife of a steel plant ladleman who died
from injuries suffered while working in his plant’s melt shop, came
86. Id. at 14–15 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. at 15 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. See Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100, 104 (Ark. 2020).
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 618 (Ark. 2020)
(internal citations omitted)).
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before the court to dispute an order from the Arkansas Workers’
Compensation Commission (“AWCC”) that held the parent
companies of her late husband’s direct employer were immune from
liability for her husband’s death.91 In making its decision, the AWCC
interpreted Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-105(a) and held
that the parent companies of Mrs. Myers’s late husband were entitled
to statutory immunity from suit.92 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision; Mrs. Meyers then appealed to the Arkansas Supreme
Court.93
In deciding Myers, the Arkansas Supreme Court novelly held that
“it is for this Court to determine what a constitutional or statutory
provision means” and that the Court does not afford deference to
agency interpretation.94 The Court discussed what it perceived as a
sometimes inconsistent history of standards used for agency
deference.95 The Court identified the application of “de novo but
deferential ‘clearly wrong’ review” where issues of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo, but the interpretation made by an
agency charged with administration is entitled to deference and should
not be overturned unless clearly wrong.96 The Court identified another
standard that was strictly based on the deferential “clearly wrong”
review with no mention or use of the de novo standard.97
Relying on the separation-of-powers doctrine, the Court in Meyers
was the first to specifically disapprove of giving deference to agency
interpretations of statutes, stating that doing so “effectively transfers
the job of interpreting the law from the judiciary to the executive.”98
The Court held that the proper standard of review is de novo and that
an agency’s interpretation is merely a tool to use for guidance and not
entitled to any deference.99
In applying the Myers standard in Hurd, the Court effectively ended
traditional agency deference in statutory interpretation. In Myers, the
Court acknowledged the history of inconsistent applications of agency
deference.100 While only applied so far in Myers and Hurd, the Court
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., 597 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Ark. 2020).
See id. at 616.
Id.
Id. at 616.
See id. at 617.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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can be expected to now review all agency decisions de novo with no
deference to any underlying agency interpretation. Neither dissent in
Hurd addressed agency deference.101 Similarly, Justice Hart’s lone
dissent in Myers did not discuss the majority’s new agency deference
standard.102 Accordingly, the justices appear to be in agreement with
the Myers standard of review. Only time will tell if the Court will
continue to apply this new standard or if it will apply another variation
to analyze agency decisions in the future.
C. Hurd’s Implications on AOGC Powers
Justice Hart, in her 2020 Hurd dissent, opined that allowing the
Commission to reduce privately negotiated lease royalty rates to a
reasonable market-based rate was an improper broadening of
Commission powers.103 She further stated that forcing the Hurds to
give up their property for less than the contract price amounted to a
government taking of property.104 However, this statement is incorrect
as the majority’s decision does not, in fact, expand the Commission’s
powers.105
1. The Commission Did Not Alter the Hurds’ Lease Terms
Justice Hart mischaracterized the Commission’s actions in entering
supplemental integration orders in this dispute. The Commission did
not alter the terms of the leases that were negotiated between the Hurds
and their family business. The Hurd family members, as lessors, were
still entitled to a 25% royalty from their lessee, the family business.106
The Court instead capped the obligation of the participating owners in
the unit (SWN) who were not parties to the Hurd leases and who the
Hurds sought to force to pay a higher-than-market royalty rate through
a self-dealing lease.107 SWN’s obligation to pay the Hurds a
reasonable royalty did not arise out of any leases; it was wholly
contained in the integration orders, which the Commission had the
statutory right to control.108
101. See Hurd v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, 601 S.W.3d 100, 106–11 (Ark. 2020)
(Baker, J., dissenting).
102. Myers, 597 S.W.3d at 620–22 (Hart, J., dissenting).
103. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 108 (Hart, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 109 (Hart, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 105 (the Commission’s authority is necessarily implied from statute).
106. Id. at 102–03.
107. Id. at 105.
108. Id.
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2. The Commission’s Statutory Authority Gives It Implied Power to
Limit an Operator’s Royalty Obligation to a Non-Consenting Owner
The Court agreed with SWN’s argument that the Commission’s
power to limit SWN’s royalty obligations to the Hurds was necessarily
implied from its statutory authority to ensure integration orders are just
and reasonable.109
Prior to Hurd, the statutory and regulatory framework of forced
integration contained a glaring gap: participating owners are
compensated with their proportionate share of production revenue;110
owners who lease their interests to the unit operator will receive a
“competitive” royalty and bonus to be determined by the Commission,
but never less than a one-eighth share;111 but how will a nonconsenting owner be compensated during the recoupment period? For
twenty-five years, this gap has been filled by language common to
integration orders: the operator, on behalf of the participating parties,
will pay to a non-consenting party the royalty rate contained in its
existing lease, unless the Commission finds that rate to be excessive
or unreasonably high.112 The Hurd decision finally confirmed this
practice as a proper exercise of the Commission’s statutory
authority.113
3. The Commission is Not Likely to Apply Hurd Too Broadly
Justice Hart asserts that the 2020 Hurd decision could lead to the
Commission disregarding royalty rates in any other mineral lease and,
in any case, will lead to subjective and disparate treatment of interest
owners throughout Arkansas.114 This fear stems from a
misunderstanding of the Commission’s action at the center of this
case.
The Commission has the implied power to determine reasonable
compensation between participating parties and non-consenting
109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(a) (2020); see also Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 105
(citing Walker v. Ark. State Bd. of Educ., 365 S.W.3d 899, 911 (Ark. 2010) (quoting
that State agencies possess such powers as are conferred by statute or are necessarily
implied from a statute)).
110. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(3) (2020).
111. Norvell, supra note 6, at 464 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4),
(d)).
112. Brief for Appellant at 17, Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v. Hurd, CV-18-223 (Ark.
June 26, 2018); State Appellants’ Reply Brief at 10, Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n v.
Hurd, CV-18-223 (Ark. Aug. 23, 2018).
113. Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 105.
114. Id. at 109 (Hart, J., dissenting).
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owners, but this is less power than the Commission has when a mineral
owner leases its interest to the unit operator.115 The Commission will
determine a competitive royalty rate for an owner who decides to lease
its interest to the operator through the integration process, but the
Commission can only cap the participating parties’ royalty obligations
to the non-consenting owners if it first finds the rate excessive or
unreasonably high.116 The majority’s holding in the Hurd decision did
not broaden the Commission’s power; it merely clarified it.
In addition, the Court acknowledged that the record contained
evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the 25% royalty
rate was excessive and unreasonable. The Hurds argued that the rate
could not be unreasonable because it was the same rate contained in
previous leases they held with SWN.117 However, the Hurds took a
chance in including a stratigraphic Pugh clause in their lease in the
hopes of a higher return.118 Due to a downturn in the market, when it
came time to re-lease new formations below the Fayetteville Shale
formation, natural gas prices significantly dropped, resulting in
reduced lease royalty rates particularly for the unproven Moorefield
Shale formation.119 In addition, because the Hurds executed the leases
with their own family-owned businesses in anticipation of integration,
the Commission had reason to believe that the royalty rate attempted
by the Hurds was inflated and not comparable to market-based royalty
rates being utilized in arms-length leases.120
In contrast, most oil and gas leases are executed under much less
suspicious circumstances. When the Commission considers whether
ordinary lease royalty rates are excessive or unreasonable, they will be
easily distinguishable from the Hurds’ case.121
Justice Hart warned that the Court’s ruling gives operators no
reason to negotiate royalty rates with landowners in good faith.122
However, an applicant for forced integration of a unit must describe
its due diligence and show that it made a bona fide effort to reach an
agreement with each owner.123 The applicant must also provide an
115.
(d)).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Norvell, supra note 6, at 464 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-304(b)(4),
Id.; Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 105.
Hurd, 601 S.W.3d at 110 (Hart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 109 (Hart. J., dissenting).
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 103, 105.
Id. at 109 (Hart, J., dissenting).
178-00 ARK. CODE R. § 001-A-3(G)(i) (LexisNexis 2020).
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affidavit showing the highest cash bonus and royalty terms that the
lessors and lessees contracted for in the unit.124
These requirements provide the Commission with evidence of what
is a just and reasonable rate under an integration order. Unit operators
will still have every reason to negotiate agreeable terms with each
property owner in a unit.
V. CONCLUSION
The Hurd case was a natural culmination of Arkansas law that
clarified the authority of the Commission and its relationship with the
Arkansas courts. Judicial review of a Commission decision allows
affected parties to challenge the actions of executive agencies,
ensuring that the Commission regulates oil and gas production within
the scope of its authority.
Further, the Commission did not alter a contract in Hurd. The
compensation owed by the unit operator to the Hurds was not
contained in a contract or dictated by a statute. Instead, the integration
order provided that a lease created between the Hurds and their own
business would set the payment rate. The Commission found this term
in the integration order to be unfair and amended it accordingly.

124. § 001-A-3(G)(ii).

